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Where to Draw the Line between Reverse Engineering
and Infringement: Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp.
Derek Prestin*
Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (“Sony”) produces and
1
sells the Sony PlayStation (“PlayStation”), a small video game
console with hand controls. The PlayStation plays games on
compact discs that are inserted into the console and displayed
2
Sony owns the copyright on the
on a television screen.
software programs that operate the PlayStation known as the
3
basic input-output system or BIOS. Connectix Corporation
makes and sells a software program called Virtual Game
4
Station. The Virtual Game Station program is a PlayStation
5
emulator.
It emulates the functioning of the PlayStation
6
console on a regular computer. This allows computer owners
to buy the Virtual Game Station software and play PlayStation
games using their computer rather than use the PlayStation
7
console. The Virtual Game Station program itself does not

* J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Chemical
Engineering, University of Minnesota, 1998. B.A. Economics, University of
Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 1999.
1. The PlayStation system consists of a console (essentially a minicomputer), controllers, and software that allows three-dimensional games to
be played on a television set. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix
Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). The PlayStation console itself
contains hardware components and software that is known as firmware that is
written on to a read-only memory chip. See id.
2. See id. at 598.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. An emulator such as the Virtual Game Station allows a consumer to
load the software onto a computer, insert a PlayStation game into the
computer’s CD-ROM drive, and play the PlayStation game using the computer
monitor. The emulator emulates both hardware and firmware components of
the Sony console. See id. at 599.
6. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598
(9th Cir. 2000). The Virtual Game Station does not play PlayStation games as
well as Sony’s PlayStation does because there are sometimes compatibility
issues with some games and some computer hardware. At the time of the
lawsuit, Connectix had marketed its Virtual Game Station for Macintosh
computer systems but had not completed a version of the Virtual Game
Station software for Windows PC’s. See id. at 599.
7. See id. at 598.
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8

contain any of Sony’s copyrighted material. However, in the
process of producing the Virtual Game Station, Connectix
repeatedly copied Sony’s copyrighted BIOS during a reverse
engineering process that Connectix undertook to determine
9
Sony brought a
how the Sony PlayStation functioned.
copyright infringement action against Connectix based upon
Connectix’s copying of the BIOS software during the reverse
10
engineering process.
During arguments for a preliminary injunction, Connectix
admitted that it copied the copyrighted BIOS software during
the development of the Virtual Game Station, but contended
that doing so was protected as a fair use under 17 U.S.C. §
11
107. The District Court for the District of Northern California
held that: (1) wholesale copying of Sony’s BIOS code by
Connectix, in order to develop emulation software, was not fair
use and (2) Connectix would be enjoined from selling the
Virtual Game Station, even though the finished emulator did
12
The district court enjoined
not contain any copied code.
Connectix from selling the Virtual Game Station and from
copying Sony’s BIOS software during development of any other
13
emulator products. The district court impounded all copies of
the Sony BIOS held by Connectix and all copies of works based
14
upon or incorporating the Sony BIOS.
Connectix appealed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: “The intermediate
8. See id.
9. See id. In order to reverse engineer the Sony BIOS Connectix
engineers purchased a Sony PlayStation console and took the Sony BIOS from
a chip inside the console. The engineers then copied the BIOS into the RAM of
a computer and observed the functioning of the Sony BIOS in conjunction with
the Virtual Game Station hardware emulation software as that hardware
emulation software was being developed. See id. at 601.
10. See id. at 598.
11. See id. at 602.
12. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d
1212, 1224 (N.D.Cal. 1999). In making its determination, the district court
held that Connectix’s intermediate copying of Sony’s code did not result in a
transformative end product designed to be compatible with the plaintiff’s code,
but rather was used to create a complete substitute for the plaintiff’s work.
See Katherine C. Spelman, Current Developments in Copyright Law 2000, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 2000, at 25, 104-05 (Practicing Law
Institute ed., 2000). The district court also determined that the intermediate
copying was substantial. See id. at 105.
13. See Sony Computer Entm’t Inc., 48 F. Supp.2d at 1224.
14. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602
(9th Cir. 2000).
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copies made and used by Connectix during the course of its
reverse engineering of the Sony BIOS were protected [by] fair
use, necessary to permit Connectix to make its non-infringing
15
Virtual Game Station function with PlayStation games.”
The issue raised by the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
fair use doctrine to Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp. is whether the intermediate copying of
software during the reverse engineering process should be
considered fair use under the Copyright Act when the final
product contains no infringing code.
The inappropriate
extension of the fair use doctrine into an area in which it does
not belong could leave software developers powerless to stop
the use of their software by others to plunder profits that would
otherwise belong to the software developer. Alternatively,
without the extension of the fair use doctrine into the area of
reverse engineering, software developers may be able to receive
copyright-like protection of functional elements of their
software due to the fact that the functional elements of the
software are not directly observable. Therefore, a happy
median must be found between these two extremes.
This Comment discusses the holding of the Ninth Circuit
in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. and
determines whether the holding was an appropriate application
of the fair use doctrine to the creation of intermediate copies of
software using the reverse engineering process.
The
background section provides the necessary foundation
regarding the fair use doctrine, the application of copyright law
to software in general, and the cases leading up to Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.
This
comment proposes here that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied
the fair use doctrine to the case at hand, but that allowing of
reverse engineering of software under the fair use doctrine
should not be extended further.
I. BACKGROUND
A. COPYRIGHT LAW AND FAIR USE
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
15. Id. at 599.
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
16
respective Writings and Discoveries.”
This Constitutional
provision is set forth in the copyright and patent laws enacted
by Congress.
Copyright law protects “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
17
the aid of a machine or device.” However, the Copyright Act
excludes from copyright protection “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
18
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” As a result,
the “mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that
19
every element of the work may be protected.” The protection
of copyright law is limited to those aspects of the work—
generally termed expression—that display the author’s
20
originality.
The primary purpose of copyright law is to increase the
21
distribution of knowledge to the public.
Copyright law is
“intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
The products of their genius after the limited period of
22
The ultimate aim of the
exclusive control has expired.”
Copyright Act is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
23
public good.” The exclusive rights conferred by the copyright
law of the United States are designed to ensure that the
contributors of knowledge receive a fair return for their

16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The types of works of authorship that are
covered by copyright law include: (1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. See id. § 102(a).
18. Id. § 102(b).
19. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348
(1991)).
20. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
547 (1985).
21. See id. at 545.
22. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
23. Id. at 432 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
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24

labors. In other words, the temporary monopoly created by
copyright law is designed to reward individual authors in order
25
to benefit the public as a whole.
However, the monopoly
privileges that Congress authorizes under the Copyright Act
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
26
special private benefit.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a collection of
27
exclusive rights to the owner of a copyright. In general terms,
these rights include the exclusive right to publish, copy, and
28
distribute the author’s work. A person that “violates any of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
29
sections 106 through 121 . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”
To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show two
elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of
30
If infringement is
expression protected by the copyright.
found to have occurred, the plaintiff may receive damages, the
defendant may be enjoined from future infringing activities, or
31
the infringing articles may be impounded or destroyed. The
copyright owner’s exclusive rights, however, are subject to
32
certain statutory exceptions set forth in the Copyright Act.
Among these limitations is Section 107, which codifies the
privilege of authors to make “fair use” of an earlier writer’s

24. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 546 (citing Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
25. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156).
26. See id. at 429.
27. These rights include the right: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental lease, or
lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28. See id.
29. Id. § 501(a).
30. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 48 F. Supp.2d at 1216 (citing Triad Sys.
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995)).
31. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504.
32. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118.
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33

work.
The fair use doctrine has historically been a judgemade exception to the exclusive rights of copyright law, but was
34
codified in the 1976 Copyright Act. Fair use has traditionally
been defined as “a privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
35
manner without his consent.”
A rationale for the fair use doctrine has been articulated
as:
[An] author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works
[has] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of
the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works
36
and thus . . . frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.

Fundamentally, the traditional concept of fair use permits
reasonable unauthorized appropriations from a prior work of
another author when the use to which the material is put
37
advances the public benefit in some way.
However, the
appropriation must not substantially impair the current or
38
potential value of the first work. The rationale behind the fair
use doctrine is that, “when the free flow of information is
sufficiently vital, it should override the copyright holder’s
39
The fair use
interest in the exclusive control of the work.”
defense “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
40
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”
The preamble of Section 107 gives examples of uses that
may be considered fair, including “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
34. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
35. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549
(1985) (citing H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260
(1944)). See also Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1336 (citing Narell v. Freeman,
872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989)).
36. Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 549 (citing H. BALL, LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
37. See id. at 549-51.
38. See id. at 550.
39. Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 364 (E.D.Va. 1994) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151-1152 (9th Cir. 1986)).
40. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399
(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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41

use), scholarship, [and] research.”
Fair use requires a
balancing of multiple factors “in light of the purposes of
42
copyright.” Section 107 states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
43
market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The statutory factors set forth in Section 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act are not exclusive, nor is any one factor
44
determinative in fair use analysis. The statutory factors must
45
be examined on a case-by-case basis and must be considered
in light of the purpose of the fair use doctrine, which is “to
prevent strict enforcement of the copyright law when its
enforcement would inhibit the very Progress of Science and
46
useful Arts that copyright is intended to promote.” Although
the four statutory factors identified by Congress are not meant
to be exclusive, they are especially relevant in determining
47
Other relevant factors may also be
whether use is fair.
considered in a fair use analysis, if necessary, since fair use is
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall
48
purposes of the Copyright Act. The analysis under the fair
use exception must not “be simplified with bright-line rules, for
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case
49
analysis.” In order to determine whether a defendant’s use of
copyrighted material may be considered fair use, a court must
consider each of the four statutory factors set forth in Section

41. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
42. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
44. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. See also Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub.
Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 1993).
45. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 549.
46. Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (internal quotation marks omitted)(citing
Penelope v. Brown, 792 F.Supp 132, 136 (D.Mass. 1992)).
47. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 560.
48. See id. See also Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916.
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S.
at 560).
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107.

50

1.

The Purpose and Character of the Allegedly Infringing Use

The first statutory factor that must be considered in a fair
51
use analysis is the purpose and character of the use. Under
this factor, the court must consider whether the alleged
infringer’s work “merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words,
52
whether and to what extent the new work is transformative.”
It is not required that a fair use be transformative, but “the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
53
weigh against a finding of fair use.” Although transformative
use of a copyrighted work is not necessary for finding a fair use,
“the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
54
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”
If
the secondary use adds value to the original—if [copyrightable
expression in the original work] is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
55
society.

When analyzing the purpose and character of the alleged
infringer’s use of a copyrighted work, a court often will begin by
looking at the preamble of Section 107. The preamble lists as
being potentially fair uses, use “for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
56
Although the
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”
50. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
52. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 455 n.40 (1984)).
55. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990)).
56. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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categories listed in the preamble “have an ‘illustrative and not
limitative’ function, . . . the illustrative nature of the categories
57
should not be ignored.”
The uses listed in the preamble
“provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that
courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair
58
uses.” As a result, the fact that the use in question falls or
does not fall under the examples given in the preamble is not
dispositive.
Courts usually consider three underlying factors in their
examination of the purpose and character of the alleged
infringer’s use of a copyrighted work for purposes of the fair use
defense: (1) whether the use was productive; (2) whether the
use was commercial; and (3) whether the alleged infringer’s
59
conduct was proper. However, none of the three factors are
60
determinative.
Despite the fact that no one factor is
determinative, some courts have argued that “the essence of
character and purpose is the transformative value, that is,
productive use, of the secondary work compared to the
61
original.” A productive use of a copyrighted work is a use that
“result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that
62
produced by the first author’s work.” The productive use of a
copyrighted work, though not determinative, normally favors a
63
finding of fair use.
The crux of the commercial and non-commercial use
distinction is “not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
64
customary price.” A commercial use of copyrighted material
does not make the use presumptively unfair; rather,
57. Id. (citing Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78
(2d Cir. 1997)).
58. Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 141 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 57778).
59. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass.
1993).
60. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522,
1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61. Id.
62. Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464, 478 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
63. See Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471, 561 U.S. 539 (1985)).
64. Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Roy Exp. Co.
Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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commercial use is but one of the factors that the court must
65
weigh. A commercial purpose of the use of a copyrighted work
does not alone defeat a fair use defense to copyright
66
infringement action. Generally a commercial purpose of the
67
use “tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” However,
where the use of the copyrighted work was an intermediate one
only, any resulting commercial exploitation of the work was
indirect or derivative and the commercial use weighs less
68
heavily against a finding of fair use. In their examination of
commercial use, courts are free to consider any public benefit
resulting from a particular use regardless of the fact that the
alleged infringer made commercial use of the copyrighted
69
The benefit to the public need not be direct or
material.
tangible, but the challenged use of the copyrighted work must
70
serve the public interest.
2.

The Nature of the Copyright Work Used by the Alleged
Infringer

The second statutory factor “calls for recognition that some
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult
71
to establish when the former works are copied.” The court’s
inquiry under this factor concerns whether the plaintiff’s work
is primarily creative as opposed to informational; the defense of
fair use has been given greater reach when the work copied is
72
Beyond this, the court should not
informational in nature.
consider the contents of the copyrighted work, even if the court
65. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994). The
Supreme Court expressly rejected the irrebutability of the presumption
against fair use in commercial contexts in Campbell when the Supreme Court
flatly reversed the Sixth Circuit for making just such a presumption.
66. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980)).
67. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
68. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir.
1992).
69. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148,
1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
70. See id.
71. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
72. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526,
1536 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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73

finds the material objectionable.
Works such as works of
fiction receive greater protection than factual works and works
which have strong factual elements, such as historical or
74
Factual works, such as biographies,
biographical works.
reviews, factual compilations, criticism, and commentary, are
“believed to have a greater public value and, therefore, uses of
75
them may be better tolerated by the copyright law.” To the
extent that the copyrighted work is “functional or factual, it
may be copied, as may those expressive elements of the work
that ‘must necessarily be used as incident to’ expression of the
76
underlying ideas, functional concepts, or facts.”
3.

The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion of the Work
Used by the Alleged Infringer

The third statutory factor considers the amount of the
copyrighted work copied by the alleged infringer and the
77
substantiality of the portion copied. “There are no absolute
rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and
78
still be considered a fair use.” Therefore, the third statutory
factor considers “not only the percentage of the original used
but also the ‘substantiality’ of that portion to the whole of the
work; that is, courts must evaluate the qualitative aspects as
79
“The court must
well as the quantity of material copied.”
weigh the significance of the copying both in terms of the
80
quantity and quality of the alleged infringement.” In other
words, the court must take into account how much of the
copyrighted work was taken and whether that portion was an

73. See id.
74. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir.
1986).
75. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
76. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879) (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
78. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263.
79. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533 (citing New Era Publ’ns v. Carol
Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990)).
80. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526,
1537 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.
1983)).
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81

essential element of the plaintiff’s work.
In general, the
greater the amount of the copyrighted work used, the less likely
82
it is that the fair use exception is applicable. However, even
83
the copying of an entire work does not preclude fair use,
84
although it does weigh against a finding of fair use.
As a
result, questions of fair use often turn on qualitative
85
assessments of the content copied. A small portion “which is
‘the heart of’ a work may not be fair use and a longer piece
86
which is pedestrian in nature may be fair use.” However, in a
case of intermediate infringement where the final product does
not contain infringing material, this factor is of “very little
87
weight.”
4. The Effect of the Alleged Infringer’s Use upon the Potential
Market for the Copyrighted Work
The final statutory factor is “the effect of the use upon the
88
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” This
factor takes into account “not only the extent of market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort
engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially
89
adverse impact on the potential market for the original.” Fair
use of a copyrighted work, when properly applied, is “limited to
copying by others which does not materially impair the
90
marketability of the work which is copied.” This factor has
81. See id. (citing Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1176).
82. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (citing Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756
(9th Cir. 1978)).
83. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
84. See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., 845 F. Supp. at 366. See also
Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., 845 F. Supp. at 365-66).
85. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir.
1986).
86. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533.
87. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th
Cir. 1992)
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
89. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)
(quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][4],
at 13-102.61 (1993)).
90. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 56667 (1985) (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
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been said to be “undoubtedly the single most important
91
element of fair use.” Analysis of the effect on the market for a
copyrighted work requires a balancing of the benefit that the
public will derive if the use is permitted against personal gain
92
that the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied. A
possibility of harm to the copyrighted work arises if the
defendant’s use would tend to diminish the sales of the
plaintiff’s work, interfere with its marketability, or fulfill the
93
In simple terms, the use of a
demand for the original.
protected work that destroys the value of the copyrighted work
94
to the copyright holder cannot be considered fair. “[A] work
that merely supplants or supersedes another is likely to cause a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market of the
95
original, [but] a transformative work is less likely to do so.”
Therefore, there is a presumption that market harm will occur
when there is direct duplication for a commercial purpose, but
there is no presumption or inference of market harm that is
applicable to cases involving something other than mere
96
duplication for commercial purposes.
The inquiry into the final statutory factor “must take
account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the
97
market for derivative works.” A derivative work is defined as
“a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation,
musical
arrangement,
dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
98
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Even
though “derivative works that are subject to the author’s
copyright transform an original work into a new mode of
1.10[D], at 1-87 (1984)).
91. Id. at 566 (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 13.05[A], at 13-76 (1984)).
92. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
93. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526,
1539 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks,
542 F. Supp. 1156, 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)).
94. Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll., 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-71 (2d Cir. 1977)).
95. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607 (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)).
96. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
97. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568
(1985) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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presentation, such works—unlike works of fair use—take
99
expression for purposes that are not ‘transformative’.”
Markets for derivative works are those markets “that creators
of original works would in general develop or license others to
100
develop.”
Even if the copying in question results in an adverse
impact on the potential market for the original work, fair use is
not precluded if the use “simply enables the copier to enter the
101
market for works of the same type as the copied work.”
This
is because an “attempt to monopolize the market by making it
impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute
a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair
102
use doctrine.”
B.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE PROGRAMS

The issue of the scope and strength of copyright protection
of computer programs has been extremely important in recent
years, primarily due to the increase in the size and importance
of the software industry. Courts have found it increasingly
difficult to address the copyright issues surrounding the
protection of software because of the idea/expression duality
inherent to software programs.
The issues surrounding the protection of computer
programs under copyright law are particularly difficult to deal
with because “computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian
103
As a result, “they
articles—articles that accomplish tasks.”
contain many logical, structural, and visual display elements
that are dictated by the function to be performed, by
considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as
104
compatibility requirements and industry demands.”
Although “there are certainly creative aspects within any
particular program, there are also those functional aspects

99. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir.
1998).
100. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
101. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir.
1992).
102. See id. at 1523-24.
103. Id. at 1524.
104. Id. (citing Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 705-08 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
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necessary to perform the given task which will not enjoy
105
copyright protection.”
Courts generally have come to the
conclusion that “the literal elements of computer programs, i.e.,
their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright
106
107
Therefore the object code of a program may be
protection.”
108
copyrighted as expression,
but the ideas and functional
elements contained in the object code are not entitled to
109
copyright protection. As a result, when there has been literal
copying of a copyrighted program, there is no question that
copyright infringement has occurred. The defendant is then
liable for that infringement unless the copying falls within the
fair use doctrine. On the other hand, when there has been no
literal infringement of the computer program the question of
whether or not infringement actually occurred is more
complicated. As a result, courts must look to certain tests to
determine whether the copyright of a program was infringed
upon.
One test used by courts to determine whether infringement
has occurred in a software copyright infringement case is the
110
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test. In this approach, the
court first looks at the “abstraction” of the computer program,
which is a breakdown of “the allegedly infringed program into
111
Next, the court examines
its constituent structural parts.”
“each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas,
expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and
112
elements that are taken from the public domain” and would
eliminate all non-protectable material from consideration of
infringement. Finally, the court would compare the allegedly
infringed program with the allegedly infringing program and
113
determine if infringement in fact had occurred.
The Ninth Circuit, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.
105. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183,
1190 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807,
815-19 (1st Cir. 1995)).
106. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
107. Object code is the binary code of the computer program that the
computer “runs” when it executes the program. Object code cannot be read by
humans. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602.
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
109. See id. § 102(b).
110. See Computer Assoc. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 706-12.
111. Id. at 706-07.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 710.
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Penguin Books USA, Inc., developed a similar test referred to
114
as the “extrinsic-intrinsic” test. The court first used “analytic
dissection to determine the scope of copyright protection before
115
[the] works are considered ‘as a whole.’”
Analytic dissection
looks at each element of each work in isolation from all of the
other elements, combinations of elements, and expression of
116
The court then determined
elements within the program.
whether there was a similarity of ideas between the two
117
programs in question, the extrinsic portion of the test.
The
second part of the test, the intrinsic portion, asked “if an
‘ordinary reasonable person’ would perceive a substantial
118
Using these two parts of the
taking of protected expression.”
test, the court then determined whether the copying of the
portions of the computer program in question constituted
infringement.
In some cases, even the direct, literal copying of a
computer program may be allowed under the fair use doctrine.
Since the object code cannot be read by humans, the
“unprotected ideas and functions of the code . . . are frequently
undiscoverable in the absence of investigation and translation
119
Even if
that may require copying the copyrighted material.”
a software developer’s final product does not contain copied
computer code, oftentimes the developer must use reverse
engineering to determine how a particular computer program
functions. In such a case, intermediate copies of the computer
program must be made in computer memory or in some other
form, such as a printout of disassembled code.
Such
intermediate copying may constitute copyright infringement
even when the end product did not itself contain copyrighted
120
but the intermediate copying could also be
material,
protected as a fair use if it was necessary to gain access to the

114. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1398 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
115. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398 (quoting Apple Computer Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994)).
116. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398 n.3.
117. See id. at 1398. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562
F.2d at 1164.
118. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398. See also Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164.
119. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602.
120. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir.
1992).
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121

functional elements of the software itself.
Where there is a
legitimate reason for a developer to study or examine the
unprotected functional aspects of a copyrighted program and
there are no other means to do so, the disassembly of the
program involved is considered a fair use under the fair use
122
doctrine.
C.

REVERSE ENGINEERING

“Reverse engineering is the process of starting with a
finished product and working backwards to analyze how the
123
product operates or how it was made.”
Software developers
designing a program that “must be compatible with a
copyrighted product frequently must ‘reverse engineer’ the
copyrighted product to gain access to the functional elements of
124
During the manufacture of a
the copyrighted product.”
computer program, a program written in source code by a
programmer is translated into object code using a computer
program called an assembler or compiler, and then copied onto
some type of storage medium, such as a silicon chip, a compact
125
Devices or programs called
disk, or a floppy disk.
disassemblers or decompilers can reverse this process by
interpreting the electronic signals that are produced while the
program is being run, “storing the resulting object code in
computer memory, and translating the object code into source
126
The devices that assemble and disassemble programs
code.”
are widely available and are commonly used within the
127
software industry.
There are four typical ways to reverse
engineer a piece of software: (1) read about the program in
available literature; (2) observe the program in operation by
using it on the computer and observing the output on the
computer screen; (3) perform a static examination of the
instructions contained within the program; or (4) perform a

121. See id. at 1524-26.
122. See id. at 1527-28.
123. Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, 722 F. Supp.
1354, 1361 n.16 (E.D. Va. 1989).
124. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 599 (citing Andrew Johnson-Laird,
Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843,
845-46 (1994)).
125. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1514 n.2.
126. Id.
127. See id.
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dynamic examination of instructions as the program is being
128
run on a computer.
In the first method of reverse engineering, the developer
gathers and reads all available literature regarding the
computer program, such as the documentation included with
the program and any other documentation available from the
software’s manufacturer. This method of reverse engineering is
the least effective, because “[d]ocumentation, by its very nature
and the manner of its production, is always incomplete,
inaccurate, and out-of-date when compared to the actual
129
software itself.”
The second, third, and fourth methods require the
developer seeking access to the program code to load the target
program onto a computer, an activity “that necessarily involves
copying the copyrighted program into the computer’s random
130
The second method of reverse
access memory or RAM.”
engineering, observation of the program while being run, may
131
take several forms.
The “ideas and functional concepts
underlying many types of computer programs, including word
processing programs, spreadsheets, and video game displays,
are readily discernible without the need for disassembly,
because the operation of such programs is visible on the
132
In such cases it is relatively easy for a
computer screen.”
person to observe the external expression of the object code and
133
determine how the object code operates.
The functional
elements of other programs that run in the background, such as
basic input-output system programs and operating systems,
cannot be readily be seen during the operation of the program
because they create little or no helpful display on the computer
screen. One of the other methods used to observe the operation
of these programs is to run the program in an emulated
environment and observe the operation of the program through
134
the use of another program known as a “debugger.” However,
128. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real
World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843, 846 (1994).
129. Id. This can clearly be seen by the fact that most software programs
include a “Readme” file, or a similar file, that contains all of the errors in and
changes made to the documentation of the program after the manual was
made.
130. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600.
131. See id.
132. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520.
133. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600.
134. See id.
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regardless of the method of observation used, “[t]he software
program is copied each time the engineer boots up the
135
computer, and the computer copies the program into RAM.”
Therefore, a direct copy is made of the computer program, but
all the copying may be intermediate; that is, the final product
136
may not contain any of the copyrighted material.
The third and fourth methods of reverse engineering
constitute true disassembly of the object code into source
137
code.
The “need to disassemble object code arises only in
connection with operations systems, system interface
procedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user
when operating—and then only when no alternative means of
gaining an understanding of those ideas and functional
138
When using either of these methods,
concepts exists.”
developers use a disassembler “to translate the ones and zeros
of binary machine-readable object code into the words and
139
This translated
mathematical symbols of source code.”
source code is similar to, but not exactly the same as, the
original source code since it does not contain the annotations
added by the program that explain the functioning of the source
140
In the third method of reverse engineering, the static
code.
examination of computer instructions, a developer disassembles
the object code for all or part of the program without running
141
During this process, the program usually
the program itself.
142
has to be copied one or more times to facilitate disassembly.
In the fourth method of reverse engineering, dynamic
examination of computer instructions, a developer uses a
disassembler to disassemble a part of the program, one set of
143
instructions at a time, while the program is in operation.
Like the third method, this method requires that several
intermediate copies of the program be made. The particular
number of copies that are made during this process depends
upon how the disassembly is completed. As a result, during the
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir.
1992).
139. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600.
140. See id. Software is generally written by programmers in source code
format and then compiled into object code.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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reverse engineering of a program using the third or fourth
methods, a direct copy is made of the computer program, but all
144
the copying is intermediate.
II. CASE DESCRIPTION
In reaching its decision in Sony Computer Entertainment,
Inc. v. Connectix Corp., the Ninth Circuit looked at the four
factors listed in Section 107: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the
145
use upon the potential market.
The court first determined
146
that Sony owned a valid copyright for its BIOS code and,
147
based upon Connectix’s admission, that copying had occurred.
The Ninth Circuit then went on to analyze each factor in
Section 107 in turn.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the repeated
intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS, in order to observe its
operation, was necessary to access unprotected elements of the
program for purposes of fair use analysis. The court also
concluded that the large numbers of copies made by Connectix
did not weigh heavily against fair use, even though Connectix
could have made fewer copies by disassembling the entire
148
BIOS. The court first determined that the trial court erred in
holding that Connectix’s commercial purpose in copying the
Sony BIOS resulted in a “presumption of unfairness that . . .
can be rebutted by the characteristics of a particular
149
Instead, the court stated that the correct
commercial use.”
legal standard was that a commercial purpose is only a
“separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair
150
The court found that Connectix’s commercial use of the
use.”
copyrighted material from Sony’s BIOS was an intermediate
151
one, and “thus was only indirect or derivative.”
The court

144. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
146. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599
(9th Cir. 2000).
147. See id. at 602.
148. See id. at 603-05.
149. Id. at 606.
150. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).
151. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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determined that “Connectix reverse-engineered the Sony BIOS
to produce a product that would be compatible with games
152
designed for the Sony PlayStation,” a purpose that has been
recognized “as a legitimate one under the first factor of the fair
153
use analysis.”
The court went on to find that Connectix’s
154
Virtual Game Station was “modestly transformative,”
in
contrast to the district court’s holding that Connectix’s
intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS code did not result in a
transformative end product designed to be compatible with the
plaintiff’s code, but instead was assigned to create a substitute
155
for the Sony’s work. The court determined that:
[t]he product creates a new platform, the personal computer,
on which consumers can play games designed for the Sony
PlayStation. This innovation affords opportunities for game play
in new environments, specifically anywhere a Sony PlayStation
console and television are not available, but a computer with a CDROM drive is. More important[ly], the Virtual Game Station itself
is a wholly new product, notwithstanding the similarity of uses and
functions between the Sony PlayStation and the Virtual Game
Station. The expressive element of software lies as much in the
organization and structure of the object code that runs the
computer as it does in the visual expression of that code that
156
appears on a computer screen.

The Virtual Game Station itself contained no code that
157
infringed on Sony’s copyright.
Therefore, the court was “at a
loss to see how Connectix’s drafting of entirely new object code
for its [Virtual Game Station] program could not be
transformative, despite the similarities in function and screen
158
output.” Based on these findings, the Ninth Circuit held that
159
this factor favored Connectix.
The Ninth Circuit then looked at the nature of Sony’s BIOS
in the realm of copyright. The court determined that Sony’s
BIOS fell at a distance from the core of copyright protection

152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522).
154. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606.
155. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d
1212, 1219-20 (N.D.Cal. 1999)
156. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th
Cir. 2000)
157. See id.
158. Id. at 606-07.
159. See id. at 607.
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because it contained unprotected aspects that could not be
160
examined without copying.
Therefore, the court accorded
Sony’s BIOS a “lower degree of protection than more traditional
161
literary works.”
Although Sony’s BIOS contained unprotected functional
elements, Connectix could not gain access to the unprotected
162
elements without copying the Sony BIOS.
There was little
publicly available technical information about the functionality
of the Sony BIOS and, since Sony’s BIOS was an internal
operating system, the functioning of the program did not
163
In order to
produce a screen display that could be observed.
gain access to the functional elements of the BIOS, Connectix
was required to access the elements “through a form of reverse
engineering that required copying the Sony BIOS onto a
164
Connectix employed several methods of reverse
computer.”
engineering, namely observation and observation with partial
disassembly, “each of which required Connectix to make
165
However, the
intermediate copies of copyrighted material.”
court determined that “[n]either of these methods renders fair
166
use protection inapplicable.”
In addition, the court
determined that the specific method of reverse engineering was
irrelevant because “intermediate copying is the gravamen of
the intermediate infringement claim, and [because] both
methods of reverse engineering require it, [the court found] no
reason inherent in these methods to prefer one to another as a
167
matter of copyright law.”
The court dismissed Sony’s argument that Connectix’s
creation of more intermediate copies than would have been
required by different methods of reverse engineering should
cause this factor to weigh against fair use because the necessity
that was “addressed in Sega was the necessity of the method,
i.e. disassembly, not the necessity of the number of times that
168
The court determined that the district
method was applied.”
160. See id. at 603 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992)).
161. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603 (quoting Sega Enters., 977
F.2d at 1526).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603.
167. Id. at 604.
168. Id. at 605 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
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court erred in finding that this factor favored Sony because
“[w]ithin the limited context of a claim of intermediate
infringement, [the court found] the semantic distinction
between ‘studying’ and ‘use’ to be artificial, and decline[d] to
169
adopt it for purposes of determining fair use.” Based on these
findings, the Ninth Circuit found that this factor favored
Connectix since the “intermediate copying in this manner was
170
‘necessary’.”
In its analysis of the amount and substantiality of
Connectix’s use, the Ninth Circuit found that Connectix had
disassembled portions of the Sony BIOS and copied the entire
171
program multiple times.
Therefore, the court determined
that this factor favored Sony and weighed against a finding of
172
fair use.
However, the court also held that “in a case of
intermediate infringement when the final product itself does
not itself contain infringing material, this factor is of ‘very little
173
weight’.”
The final factor that the Ninth Circuit looked to in its fair
use analysis of Connectix’s copying of Sony’s BIOS was the
effect on the market for the Sony PlayStation. The Ninth
Circuit determined that the Virtual Game Station did not
merely supplant Sony’s game consoles, despite the similarities
between the operation of the program and the hardware
console, but instead created a whole new platform for
174
The court concluded that it was possible
PlayStation games.
that Sony will lose console sales and profits due to the sale of
175
the Virtual Game Station.
However, since the Virtual Game
Station was transformative, and “does not merely supplant the
PlayStation console, the Virtual Game Station is a legitimate
competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and
176
Therefore, “some
Sony-licensed games can be played.”
economic loss by Sony as a result of this competition does not
177
compel a finding of no fair use.”
The Ninth Circuit

1524-26 (9th Cir. 1992)).
169. Id. at 604.
170. Id.
171. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 606-607.
175. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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determined that, although Sony was likely to lose sales as a
result of the introduction of the Virtual Game Station on the
market, this factor favored a finding of fair use because the
Virtual Game Station was a legitimate competitor in the
market for platforms on which PlayStation games could be
178
played.
The Ninth Circuit found that three of the statutory fair use
factors favored Connectix, while one favored Sony and that
factor was “of little weight” because the final product contained
179
no infringing code.
The Ninth Circuit determined that
“Connectix’s intermediate copying of the Sony BIOS during the
course of its reverse engineering of the product was a fair use
180
In addition, the
under 17 U.S.C. § 107, as a matter of law.”
court concluded “there is a legitimate public interest in the
181
publication of Connectix’s software.”
The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS was
necessary to access unprotected functional elements of the
BIOS and was a fair use.
As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, a process that is
widely used within the software industry, and whose legality
had yet to be determined, was found to be a fair use of
copyrighted material. The court’s holding reiterated and
clarified the court’s prior decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
182
Accolade, Inc., which held that “[w]here there is good reason
for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a
copyrighted computer program, disassembly for purposes of
183
The Ninth
such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”
Circuit’s holding in Sega left open the possibility that the use of
disassembly or an equivalent form of reverse engineering to
study or examine a computer program for the purpose of
184
The
making a compatible product might not be a fair use.
court’s subsequent holding in Sony Computer Entertainment,
Inc. v. Connectix Corp. eliminated the confusion surrounding
the legality of the commercial use of information gathered
178. See id. at 607-08.
179. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 608.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 608 n.11.
182. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
183. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520.
184. The confusion regarding the exact limits of the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Sega is evident in the district court’s decision in this case. See Sony
Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
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during reverse engineering of a computer program. As a
consequence, the protection of the non-functional, creative
elements of computer programs has been left intact but the
software industry may continue to use reverse engineering to
aid in its development of compatible products without the
worry of facing liability for copyright infringement.
III. ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., one must
apply copyright law and the fair use doctrine to the facts of the
case.
The first step is to determine whether the Sony BIOS falls
185
under the protection of the copyright law. The object code of
the Sony BIOS undoubtedly is protected by copyright as
186
expression, because the Copyright Act does not “require that
a work be directly accessible to humans in order to be eligible
187
for copyright protection.”
The functional elements of the
BIOS, likewise, undoubtedly fall outside the scope of copyright
188
protection.
Under the Copyright Act, “society is free to
exploit facts, ideas, processes, or methods of operation in a
189
copyrighted work.”
In order “[t]o protect processes or
methods of operation, a creator must look to patent laws,”
190
rather than copyright laws.
Since the object code, wherein
the functional aspects of the program lie, cannot be read by
humans, the “unprotected ideas and functions of the code . . .
are frequently undiscoverable in the absence of investigation
and translation that may require copying the copyrighted
191
In the process of reverse engineering to examine
material.”
the unprotected portions of a software program, an
intermediate copy of the computer program must normally be
185. Object code is the binary code of the computer program that the
computer “runs” when it executes the program. Object code cannot be read by
humans. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,
602 (9th Cir. 2000).
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
187. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1519.
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
189. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
190. See id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 159-64 (1989)).
191. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602.
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made in computer memory. The Copyright Act seems to
192
encompass and proscribe such intermediate copying,
and
such intermediate copying may constitute copyright
infringement even when the end product did not itself contain
193
However, the question of whether the
copyrighted material.
intermediate copying of a computer program is infringement is
not completely clear based solely on the text of the Copyright
Act, and as a result the question has been answered on a caseby-case basis.
Intermediate copying may be protected as a fair use if it
was necessary to gain access to the functional elements of the
194
software itself. This is due to the fact that “the Copyright Act
permits an individual in rightful possession of a copy of a work
to undertake necessary efforts to understand the work’s ideas,
195
processes, and methods of operation.” Therefore, where there
is a legitimate reason for a developer to study or examine the
unprotected functional aspects of a copyrighted program and
there are no other means to do so, the disassembly of the
program and the making of the intermediate copies must be
196
In order to determine
analyzed under the fair use doctrine.
whether the use of a copyrighted work was fair, one must
consider the four statutory factors set forth in Section 107:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
197
market for or value of the copyrighted work.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1518.
See id. at 1519.
See id. at 1527.
Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 842.
See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1527-28.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED
SOFTWARE IN A PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING DURING
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPATIBLE PROGRAMS SUPPORTS A
FINDING OF FAIR USE.

The first statutory factor that must be considered in a fair
198
use analysis is the purpose and character of the use.
The
question under this factor is whether Connectix’s Virtual Game
Station “merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation,
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
199
what extent the new work is ‘transformative’.”
In its analysis of this factor in Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., the Ninth Circuit
neglected to consider the preamble to Section 107, but the
omission was not a major fault in its analysis. The preamble
lists uses “such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
200
It is possible that
research” as being potential fair uses.
Connectix’s intermediate copies of Sony’s BIOS could be
considered copies made for research purposes since the copies
were made to determine how the program functioned.
However, the categories listed in the preamble of Section 107
seem to be based on activities in which the user of the work
expects little commercial return on the user’s use of the
material. In contrast, Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS was to
develop a commercial product that was compatible with the
Sony BIOS. Therefore, Connectix expected to receive an
indirect commercial return from its use of Sony’s BIOS during
the development of the Virtual Game Station. This seems to
mitigate against a determination that Connectix’s use falls
under the categories espoused in the preamble to Section 107.
However, the categories listed in the preamble “have an
201
‘illustrative and not limitative’ function” and the uses listed
in the preamble “provide only general guidance about the sorts
of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found
198. See id. § 107(1) (2000).
199. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
200. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 n.1 (2d Cir.
1998).
201. Id.
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202

to be fair uses.”
Therefore, whether or not Connectix’s use is
a fair use is not determined by the consideration of the
categories listed in the preamble, despite the fact the categories
seem to slightly weigh against a finding of fair use.
The next step in the analysis of the purpose and character
of Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS for purposes of the fair use
defense is to consider: (1) whether the use was productive; (2)
whether the use was commercial; and (3) whether Connectix’s
203
The Ninth Circuit also neglected to
conduct was proper.
directly undertake this portion of the purpose and character
analysis. However, the Court did, in effect, consider the first
two sub-factors because it considered whether the Virtual
Game Station was transformative and considered Connectix’s
204
The Court did not consider
commercial use of Sony’s BIOS.
whether Connectix’s conduct was proper.
A productive use of a copyrighted work is a use that
“result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that
205
produced by the first author’s work.” In Connectix’s case, the
Ninth Circuit correctly found that the Virtual Game Station
206
was a transformative, and therefore productive, work.
Although both programs have similar uses and functions, the
Virtual Game Station is an entirely new product that does not
include any code contained in Sony’s BIOS. The Virtual Game
Station allows players of PlayStation games to play games on
an entirely new platform, the personal computer, which would
be unavailable without the Virtual Game Station. Therefore,
the Virtual Game Station is not a direct substitute for the
PlayStation, although it certainly is a competitor, as it would
be had Connectix’s engineers directly copied Sony’s BIOS and
made a PlayStation console clone.
In addition, the
development of the Virtual Game Station involved a great deal
of creativity on the part of Connectix’s engineers to write a
program that allowed PlayStation games to be played on a
computer with components that vary widely from computer to
computer as opposed to a PlayStation console that contains a

202. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998).
203. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.Mass.
1993).
204. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606-607.
205. Rubin, 836 F.Supp. at 916 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
206. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606.
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set type of hardware that does not vary from console to console.
Overall, Connectix’s productive use of Sony’s BIOS, though not
207
determinative, strongly favors a finding of fair use.
Connectix admitted that its engineers disassembled Sony’s
code not just to study the concepts, but to actually use the code
208
in the development of the Virtual Game Station.
In
Connectix’s case it was clear that the use was intended to be
commercial—the development of the Virtual Game Station was
a commercial endeavor. However, a commercial purpose of the
use of a copyrighted work does not alone defeat a fair use
209
defense to copyright infringement action and does not make
210
the use presumptively unfair as the district court held.
The
Supreme Court directly rejected this type of presumption in
Campbell and therefore the application of such a presumption
211
In other
to fair use analysis in any case is inappropriate.
words, the commercial nature of Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS
212
cannot be given dispositive weight in the fair use analysis. A
commercial purpose of the use does tend “to weigh against a
finding of fair use” and therefore Connectix’s commercial
213
purpose in its use of Sony’s BIOS tends to favor Sony. Where
the use of the copyrighted work was an intermediate one only,
“any commercial ‘exploitation’ was indirect or derivative” and
the commercial use weighs less heavily against a finding of fair
214
use.
The crux of the commercial and non-commercial use
distinction is “not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
215
Connectix, however, did not directly
customary price.”
207. See Rubin, 836 F.Supp. at 916 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471, 561 U.S. 539 (1985)).
208. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d
1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
209. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980)).
210. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-91 (1994).
211. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 585).
212. See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183,
1189 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585).
213. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
214. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir.
1992).
215. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
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exploit Sony’s BIOS. Connectix merely used Sony’s BIOS to
examine the way that the program functioned so that it could
develop a compatible product on its own. Without the ability to
study Sony’s BIOS for the purpose of determining how its
functional elements work, Connectix would be unable to
develop a compatible product and would have given Sony a de
facto monopoly over the functional elements of its BIOS for as
long as its copyright lasted. A monopoly over functional
elements such as this is directly opposed to the ultimate aim of
copyright law “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
216
public good.”
In order to receive such protection of the
functional elements of its BIOS, Sony must seek protection
under the more stringent requirements of patent law rather
than copyright law. As a result, Connectix’s commercial
purpose in its use of Sony’s BIOS tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use, but only marginally so due to the offsetting
effect of the public policy ramifications that would result from
such a finding.
The final sub-factor of the purpose and character of use
analysis is whether Connectix’s conduct was proper. This subfactor turns largely upon whether Connectix acted in bad faith
217
when it copied Sony’s BIOS. Connectix copied Sony’s BIOS in
a good faith effort to develop its own product. Connectix did
not literally copy Sony’s code into its own product, but rather
only observed the operation of Sony’s BIOS to discover how it
functioned. Connectix approached Sony during its development
of the Virtual Games Station in order to request technical
assistance, and thereby avoid making intermediate copies of
218
Sony also does
Sony’s BIOS, but Sony declined the request.
not make the information regarding the BIOS of the
219
PlayStation available to the public.
As a result, Connectix
had no other way to access unprotected functional elements of
Sony’s BIOS that did not involve intermediate copying. Despite
the fact that Sony denied Connectix permission to make
intermediate copies of its BIOS and Connectix made
intermediate copies on its own, this does not favor a finding
562 (1985) (citing Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
216. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984).
217. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 918-19 (D. Mass.
1993).
218. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 601.
219. See id. at 600.
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that Connectix acted improperly, nor does it preclude a finding
220
of fair use. Therefore, this sub-factor favors Connectix.
Overall, there is one sub-factor that strongly favors
Connectix, one sub-factor that merely favors Connectix, and
one sub-factor that weakly favors Sony. These sub-factors,
together with the preamble, which slightly favors Sony, weigh
toward a finding that the purpose and character factor of the
fair use analysis favors Connectix. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit correctly determined that the purpose and character of
Connectix’s use favored a finding of fair use.
B.

DUE TO THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE, THE
PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING DURING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPATIBLE PROGRAMS IS FAIR USE,
PARTICULARLY WHEN UNPROTECTED FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS
CANNOT BE ACCESSED WITHOUT COPYING.

The second statutory factor concerns whether Sony’s BIOS
is primarily creative as opposed to informational or
221
functional.
The defense of fair use has been given a greater
222
reach when the work copied is informational in nature.
Factual works, such as biographies, reviews, factual
compilations, criticism, and commentary, are “believed to have
a greater public value and, therefore, uses of them may be
223
Since Sony’s BIOS is
better tolerated by the copyright law.”
primarily a functional work, albeit with some expressive
elements such as its overall structure and specific object and
source code, the BIOS would seem to fall toward the ‘factual’
end of the copyright spectrum and would be protected by a
‘thin’ copyright. When the nature of the work requires
intermediate copying to understand ideas and processes in the
copyrighted work, that nature supports intermediate copying
as a fair use; thus, “reverse engineering of object code to discern
224
To
unprotected ideas in a computer program is a fair use.”
220. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
221. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526,
1536 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
222. See id.
223. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522,
1532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,
96 (2d Cir. 1987)).
224. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the extent that the copyrighted work is “functional or factual, it
may be copied, as may those expressive elements of the work
that ‘must necessarily be used as incident to’ expression of the
225
underlying ideas, functional concepts, or facts.”
Connectix
could not gain access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s
226
BIOS without copying it.
There was little publicly available
technical information about the functionality of the Sony BIOS.
Sony’s BIOS was also an operating system which did not
produce a screen display as a result of its functioning,
precluding the opportunity to determine how it functioned
227
Therefore, in order to gain access
based on screen displays.
to the functional elements of the BIOS it was necessary for
Connectix to access the elements through some form of reverse
engineering that required intermediate copies of the BIOS to be
228
made. The nature of Sony’s BIOS and the resulting difficulty
in accessing unprotected elements of the software program
cause this factor to favor Connectix.
C.

ALTHOUGH THE REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE MAY
REQUIRE THE COPYING OF AN ENTIRE PROGRAM, THE USE OF
THE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IS FAIR IF THE COPYING WAS
NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE UNPROTECTED ELEMENTS
OF THE PROGRAM AND THE FINAL PRODUCT DOES NOT
CONTAIN COPIED CODE.

The third statutory factor considers the amount of Sony’s
BIOS copied by Connectix and the substantiality of the portion
229
copied.
The amount of Sony’s BIOS copied by Connectix is
clear; the entire BIOS was copied during the process of reverse
230
engineering and was copied multiple times.
However,
“translation of a program from object code into source code
231
cannot be accomplished without making copies of the code.”

225. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879) (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
226. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
230. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606.
231. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.
1992).
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Even the copying of an entire work does not preclude fair use,
233
although it does weigh against finding of fair use.
The
substantiality of the portion of Sony’s BIOS is also clear; since
the entire program was copied, and when an entire computer
software program is copied, there is no doubt that protected
234
Therefore, this factor
elements of the software were copied.
favors Sony. However, in a case of intermediate infringement
where the final product does not contain infringing material,
235
this factor is of “very little weight.”
In the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the amount and
substantiality of Sony’s BIOS copied by Connectix, the Court
neglected to address several important issues that, although
not important in the instant case, may be important in future
applications of the Court’s decision. The fair use reproductions
of a computer program made during activities such as reverse
engineering “must not exceed what is necessary to understand
236
In Connectix’s case,
the unprotected elements of the work.”
the reverse engineering of Sony’s BIOS required the copying of
the entire program to complete the process.
Therefore,
Connectix copied no more than was required to understand the
unprotected elements of the work. The second issue not
addressed by the court is that “[a]ny reproduction of protectable
expression must be strictly necessary to ascertain the bounds of
237
Again, since the
protected information within the work.”
copying of the entire BIOS was necessary during the process of
reverse engineering, the reproduction of the protected elements
of the program was necessary to determine the protected and
functional portions of the program. Because the court chose not
to address these issues, the court’s holding may be interpreted
by some to be far broader than it should be. Some may
interpret the court’s holding as supporting the proposition that
any copying during the process of reverse engineering, whether
necessary to access the unprotected elements of the program or
not, is a fair use. Based upon this proposition, some developers
232. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
449-50 (1984).
233. See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 365 (E.D.Va. 1994).
234. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335
(9th Cir. 1995).
235. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526-27.
236. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
237. See id.
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may resort to the copying of a program during the process of
reverse engineering, even when the copying is not necessary to
access unprotected elements of the program, and infringe upon
the copyright of the program. If this occurs, there would be yet
another round of litigation to determine the bounds of the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that could have just as easily be
established in the instant case. Although neither of these
issues would have changed the outcome of the instant case, the
Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify the limits of its
holding of fair use and, as a result, issues such as these may
come before the court at a later date.
D. THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE TO DEVELOP A
COMPATIBLE PRODUCT THROUGH REVERSE ENGINEERING
DOES NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE POTENTIAL
MARKET FOR OR VALUE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK, ASIDE
FROM THE EFFECTS THAT RESULT FROM ANY KIND OF
COMPETITION IN THE MARKETPLACE.

The final statutory factor is the effect of the use upon the
238
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.
The
final statutory factor takes into account not only the extent of
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged
infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
239
This factor is “the single most
market” for the original.
240
important element of fair use.”
The potential for harm to
Sony’s BIOS arises if Connectix’s use would tend to diminish
the sales of Sony’s work, interfere with its marketability, or
241
If the production of
fulfill the demand for the original.
PlayStation emulators became widespread, the market for the
Sony PlayStation may become less lucrative. However, the fact

238. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
239. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)
(quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][4], at
13-102.61 (1993)).
240. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566 (1985) (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
13.05[A], at 13-76 (1984)).
241. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526,
1539 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks,
542 F. Supp. 1156, 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)).
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that the emulators are not, contrary to the finding of the
242
district court, direct substitutes for the PlayStation console,
since they run PlayStation games on a completely new
platform, would mean that it is unlikely that the widespread
production of emulators would have a “substantially adverse
243
The adverse impact
impact on the potential market.”
suffered by the market for Sony PlayStation consoles would be
no different than the effect of the introduction of competition
into any other market and in fact would probably be less since
the PlayStation console and emulators are not direct
244
In other words, Connectix’s Virtual Game
competitors.
Station does not merely supplant the Sony PlayStation console,
but instead is transformative and competes with the
PlayStation console in the market for platforms upon which
PlayStation games may be played. There is a presumption that
market harm will occur when there is direct duplication for a
commercial purpose, but that is not the case with Connectix’s
use of Sony’s BIOS; thus, there is no presumption or inference
245
of market harm that is applicable to the instant case.
Therefore, the first part of the market effect factor favors
Connectix.
Analysis of the effect on the market for a copyrighted work
also requires a balancing of the benefit that the public will
derive if use is permitted against the personal gain that the
246
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied. In this case,
the public benefit if the use is permitted is great—a whole new
class of platforms for PlayStation games will open up and be
available for use by fans of PlayStation games. On the other
hand, the personal gain that Sony will receive if use is denied is
a gain of an unprecedented level of protection for its software
products. “If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an
unfair use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto
monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that
242. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d
1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
243. See id. at 1221.
244. The two products are not direct competitors since the PlayStation
console and emulators are merely similar products made for similar uses
rather than versions of basically the same product made for the same use,
such that the purchase of one naturally excludes purchase of the other. This
is not the case with the PlayStation and emulators since consumers may buy
one or the other or both of the products.
245. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
246. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
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were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.” The
functional elements of Sony’s software would effectively be
protected by copyright law, if a finding of fair use was denied.
This is due to the fact that the functional aspects of Sony’s
BIOS can only be accessed through the reverse engineering and
study of the software, which due to the type of software,
necessarily entails copying that would be prevented by
copyright law. In order for Sony “to enjoy a lawful monopoly
over the idea or functional principle underlying a work, [Sony]
must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the
248
patent laws.” Therefore, the balancing of the benefit that the
public will derive if the use is permitted against the personal
gain that the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied
tends to favor Connectix.
Based on the two methods of analysis under the final
statutory factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market
for, or value of, the copyrighted work, this factor favors
Connectix.
E. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT THAT RESULTS FROM THE FRUITS OF
REVERSE ENGINEERING AND THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW MAKE THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE
DURING THE PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING A FAIR USE.

The public policy ramifications of a finding of or denial of
fair use must be a consideration in fair use analysis because
the ultimate purpose of copyright law is to benefit the public,
through the distribution of knowledge, rather than the
249
author.
The ultimate aim of the Copyright Act is “to
250
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”
The
temporary monopoly created by copyright law is designed to
benefit the public as a whole, rather than to reward individual
251
authors. Therefore, the effect on the public benefit of a denial
of fair use must be considered. In this case, the benefit the
247. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing 17 U.S.C. 102(b)).
248. See id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 159-64 (1989)).
249. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
546 (1985).
250. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984).
251. See id. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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public will receive if the use of a copyrighted program in the
development of compatible products is permitted is great—the
inability to develop compatible products would seriously
disrupt the computer industry and greatly increase the
development costs of computer products. In a time where there
are a great multitude of hardware and software manufacturers,
the compatibility of software with other software and across the
many computer platforms that are available is integral to the
effective and efficient use of computers. In addition, a finding
that a use such as Connectix’s is not fair would do a great
disservice to the public because Sony, and any other developer
producing software with strong functional elements, would
receive an unprecedented level of protection for its software
products. Under such a finding, both the expressive and
functional elements of Sony’s software would effectively be
protected by copyright law. This is due to the fact that the
functional aspects of Sony’s BIOS can only be accessed through
the reverse engineering and study of the software, which
necessarily entails copying that would be prevented by such a
finding. Without the ability to study copyrighted software to
determine how its functional elements work, other developers
would be unable to develop compatible products. Therefore, a
finding that the use of copyrighted software in the process of
reverse engineering is unlawful would give the software owner
a de facto monopoly over the functional elements of its program
for as long as its copyright lasted. A monopoly over functional
elements such as this is directly opposed to the ultimate aim of
copyright law “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
252
public good.” In order for an author of a software program “to
enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle
underlying a work, [the author] must satisfy the more stringent
253
Due to the
standards imposed by the patent laws.”
ramifications of the granting of a de facto monopoly over
functional elements of computer programs to copyright owners,
in direct opposition to the purposes of copyright law, public
policy strongly supports a finding of fair use in situations in
which copying of a program during reverse engineering is
necessary to access unprotected functional elements of the
program.

252. See id. at 432.
253. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that three of the
statutory fair use factors favored Connectix, while one favored
Sony and that factor was “of little weight” because the final
254
product contained no infringing code.
The court correctly
held that the “intermediate copies made and used by Connectix
during the course of its reverse engineering of the Sony BIOS
were protected [by] fair use, necessary to permit Connectix to
make its non-infringing Virtual Game Station function with
255
PlayStation games.” This holding reiterated and clarified the
Ninth Circuit’s previous decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
256
Accolade, Inc. which held that “[w]here there is good reason
for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a
copyrighted computer program, disassembly for purposes of
257
The
such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”
holding in Sega arguably did not cover cases in which the user
utilized disassembly or an equivalent form of reverse
engineering to study or examine a computer program for the
purpose of using the gathered information to make their own
258
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in the
compatible product.
instant case eliminated some of the confusion surrounding the
legality of the commercial use of information gathered during
reverse engineering of a computer program caused by the
court’s decision in Sega. This holding correctly extends fair use
protection far enough to protect the use of reverse engineering
to produce compatible products and to prevent software
developers from gaining de facto monopoly over the functional
aspects of their work.
However, the holding misses an
opportunity to correctly limit the application of the decision
only to cases in which the making of intermediate copies of a
software program during reverse engineering is necessary to
access unprotected elements and there is no other way to do so.
This omission is likely to result in a future round of litigation
designed to determine the applicability and the bounds of the
necessity requirement in the use of reverse engineering of other

254. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608
(9th Cir. 2000).
255. See id. at 599.
256. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
257. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520.
258. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d
1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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types of software.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. is an appropriate
application of the fair use doctrine to the reverse engineering of
computer software. As a result of the court’s ruling, a process
that was already widely used within the software industry was
decided to be a fair use of copyrighted material. The protection
of the non-functional, creative elements of computer programs
has been left intact by the Ninth Circuit’s holding, but the
software industry may continue to use reverse engineering to
aid in its development of compatible products without worry of
facing liability for copyright infringement. Therefore, the
holding of the court in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp. correctly balances these competing interests of
software developers and the public.

